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In Search of the Unstated: 
The Enthymeme and/of Whiteness 
FCrista Flatcliffe 
I am pleased to be responding to Matthew Jackson's article. Not only am 
I fascinated with the enthymeme as rhetorical tactic and with whiteness 
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as rhetorical trope, but I am also intrigued with how, together, they afford 
me an opportunity to contemplate the unstated. Lately I have been 
thinking about how the unstated influences rhetorical performances of 
thought, communication, and action. Perhaps a physics analogy will 
explain my thinking. Physicists now believe that approximately 95% of 
the universe is composed of dark matter and dark energy, both of which 
cannot be seen but can be detected by their influence on visible matter. If 
you have seen images mapping the cosmic journey from planet to solar 
system to galaxy to ever-expanding universe, what can be seen is only 5%. 
That is a staggering percentage. From a rhetorical point of view, dark 
matter and energy serve as metaphors for the unstated. After all, we do not 
see the unstated in texts; we simply experience its effects. Given this 
"rhetorical situation" ofthe unstated, we need tactics for measuring these 
effects, and as Jackson's article suggests, the enthymeme is one such 
strategy for articulating, analyzing, negotiating, employing, revising, or 
rejecting the unstated. Engaging the enthymeme in these ways is a 
productive performance of pedagogy, whether in the classroom or 
beyond. 
What exactly is the unstated? To answer that question, let's begin 
with an everyday practice (thank you, Michel de Certeau) and examine 
the definition of unstated on dictionary. com: 1 
-adjective 
not made explicit; "the unexpressed terms of the agreement"; 
"things left unsaid"; "some kind of unspoken agreement"; "his 
action is clear but his reason remains unstated[.]" 
From a rhetorical perspective, these five definitions signify some inter-
esting points. The first implies that the unstated may always be implicit, 
implied. The second, third, and fourth imply that the unstated may always 
be unspoken, either on purpose or not. And the fifth implies that the 
unstated haunts actions in that actions are always driven by reasons, 
whether stated or not. However, in search of more ideas about the 
unstated, let's take another tact. Because the negative is a valid means of 
definition (if not proof), let's look at what dictionary. com says about 
stated and, by extrapolation, what it implies about unstated. 
If dictionary. com defines stated as follows: 
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-adjective 
1. fixed or settled: a stated pricer;] 
2. explicitly set forth; declared as fact[;] 
3. recognized or official[;] 
then, it stands to reason that unstated might be defined as: 
-adjective 
1. not fIXed or settled: an unstated pricer;] 
2. not explicitly set forth; not declared as fact[;] 
3. not recognized or not official. 
From a rhetorical perspective, such extrapolated defmitions of unstated 
are a little more interesting in terms of the term's import for Jackson's 
postmodem enthymeme. The first implies that the unstated may always 
be in flux. The second implies that the unstated may always be an invisible 
yet haunting presence as well as always up for negotiation since it is not 
"fact." The third implies that the unstated may be unknown (not recog-
nized) or unacknowledged (not official) or not reflected upon (not re-
cognized). As such, the unstated is not simply the inverse of the stated in 
terms of effect because both the unstated and the stated do affect thought, 
communication, and action. As such, the unstated is not simply an 
absence because (like dark matter and energy) it is present and detectable, 
just invisible. And as such, the unstated is not simply a gap waiting to be 
filled with "meaning" because the unstated signifies ... as many different 
things. That is why Jackson's concept of the postmodem enthymeme is 
important: it helps us articulate, analyze, negotiate, employ, revise, or 
reject multiple significations of the unstated. So in what space I have 
available here, I will engage the unstated in terms of the enthymeme and/ 
of whiteness. 
The Unstated: The Enthymeme 
As I mentioned earlier, the enthymeme fascinates me. Ask any TA whom 
I've ever trained to teach composition. During TA Orientation I always 
ask, "How many of you have heard of the enthymeme?" Sometimes a 
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lonely scholar raises herlhis hand. However, when I ask what it is, rarely 
can anyone provide a definition or even an example. I am continually 
amazed thatthe enthymeme has dropped out of common usage. Yes, a few 
rhetoric scholars dress it up and, on occasion, take it to the scholarly fair. 
But in the practices of everyday life (thank you, again, M. de Certeau), 
people rarely know the concept or use the term, even as every single 
person regularly composes enthymemes in writing, speech, and body 
language. So what is an enthymeme? Jackson does a nice job of rehears-
ing competing scholarly definitions in his article, so fornow, I will simply 
follow Aristotle's lead from his Prior Analytics and begin with his idea 
that an enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism (bk. 2, pt. 27)-that is, a way 
of reasoning about particulars that takes into account probable assump-
tions, reasons, and claims ... any of which may be unstated.2 
Although philosophers worry about mathematical precision in a 
syllogism (that is, making sure thatthe major premise, minor premise, and 
conclusion are all perfectly stated in substitutive order), rhetoricians 
worry less about mathematical precision in the enthymeme. For as 
Jackson claims, enthymemes "are not laid out so neatly for us" (605); 
unlike a syllogism, the enthymeme is often missing a major or minor 
premise and sometimes even a stated conclusion. Although popularly 
defined as a ''truncated'' syllogism, the enthymeme is more than simply 
an incomplete or inferior syllogism. (That way of reasoning was em-
ployed for centuries to subordinate rhetoric to philosophy). Instead, it is 
a related but different way of reasoning. A syllogism is grounded in 
general, universal truths; the enthymeme, however, is grounded in 
probability, particular cases, and common sense (or the sense a culture 
holds in common), a grounding that makes it a perfect companion for 
Jackson's foray into postmodemism. 
What is important about the "missing elements" in the enthymeme is 
that they function as the unstated. And as Aristotle tells us, such unstated 
assumptions, reasons, or claims may be supplied by audiences, hence the 
Aristotelian charge that interlocutors know their audiences. Although 
understanding every particular audience member's psyche may be an 
impossible endeavor, understanding some cultural assumptions of an 
audience is not; different kinds of understanding may be achieved via 
study, reflection, and lived engagement. And it is from this cultural 
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common sense that an interlocutor may accrue unstated assumptions that 
may, in tum, be used to construct enthymemes as well as to fill in unstated 
parts. However, the enthymeme is not a sure thing. Just as there are many 
different cultural assumptions, there are also many different possible 
ways to fill in the unstated. That is just one reason communication is 
difficult ... and always ongoing, as Jackson makes clear in his discussion 
of the postmodem enthymeme. 
OK, let's ground this discussion for a moment. 
Scene 1: Suppose I walk into my first-year writing classroom, talk 
with the students for a couple minutes, and then say, "Class is cancelled 
today." Grounded in my ethos as ''the teacher," I have, with that one small 
claim, persuaded twenty students to pack up their backpacks, leave the 
room, and (probably) rejoice. But! will bet my last penny that at least one 
of the students leaving the room will think or say, "I wonder why she 
cancelled class?" That student is curious about the "because." He/she is 
trying to reason enthymemically, that is, to fill in reasons and assumptions 
for my clajm that class is cancelled. I have not provided enough informa-
tion for students to complete my enthymeme successfully, so the audience 
is left speculating. 
Scene 2: Suppose I walk into my first-year writing classroom, talk 
with the students for a couple of minutes, and then say, "You all bore me 
today. Class is cancelled." With those two short sentences, I have 
persuaded twenty students to pack up their backpacks and leave the room, 
but! will bet my last penny that, in this case, most of them will be insulted. 
And rightly so. They may even complain to parents or higher administra-
tion. Why? Because they do not accept my enthymemic reasoning, 
consisting of an unstated assumption (a teacher's being bored is a valid 
reason for cancelling a class), a stated reason (you bore me), and a stated 
claim (class is cancelled). Some students may take issue with boredom 
being a valid reason for cancelling class; others may take issue with being 
called boring; still others may simply be glad of any reason that cancels 
class; and perhaps a few will be motivated to elevate their performances 
just to prove something to me or to themselves. 
Scene 3: Suppose I walk into my first-year writing classroom, talk 
with the students for a couple of minutes, and then say, "You know what? 
Class is cancelled because I'm feeling really ill today." With these 
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sentences, 1 have again persuaded twenty students to pack up their 
backpacks and leave the room, but on their way out a few of them will 
offer, "I hope you're feeling better soon." Some may even recount a 
sympathy narrative oftheir or their roommate's being ill. But they will not 
usually complain. Why? Because they accept my enthymemic reasoning, 
consisting of an unstated assumption (a teacher's being ill is a valid 
reason for cancelling a class), a stated reason (I am ill), and a claim (class 
is cancelled). 
Aristotle celebrates the ~nthymeme as a rhetorical tactic; however, it 
has fallen by the wayside of rhetorical studies, assumed to be overly dry 
and overly rigid. That is a shame. And that is why 1 am delighted to be 
contemplating Jackson's postmodem take on the enthymeme, which 
celebrates the multiplicity ofthe unstated haunting enthymemic reason-
ing. For example, in Scene 3, perhaps a few students may think that my 
being ill is not a valid reason for cancelling class; perhaps they may think 
that 1 should have gotten a substitute or held class online from my home; 
and, of course, there may be the student who, having pulled an all-nighter 
studying for a test in another class, really does not care why my class is 
cancelled but is simply grateful for the time to take a quick nap. Given 
these different possibilities (and myriad others 1 have not mentioned), 
when Aristotle's notion of probability is merged with the postmodem 
notion of multiplicity, the enthymeme may appear to be dodgy proposi-
tion because it is hard to nail down. But the previous statement is an 
enthymeme (actually a couple). And that is precisely Jackson's point: a 
postmodem take on the enthymeme allows innumerable ways to imagine 
arguments and to render visible those imaginings. This multiplicity does 
not necessarily mean that anything goes; however, it does mean that there 
is always more to the universe than meets the eye. As such, the enthymeme 
is an invention tool that works at all stages of the composing process, 
whether one is composing via reading, writing, speaking, or listening and 
whether one is in a writing class, at ajob interview, on a date, or via self-
reflection. 
Given that Jackson posits the enthymeme as an antiracist strategy, it 
seems incumbent on readers to consider the political functions of the 
enthymeme. Given its focus on cultural common sense, the enthymeme 
possesses a conservative power (that is, a means for retaining the status 
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quo) whether the status quo is liberal or conservative, progressive or 
totalitarian. Unstated assumptions not only drive thought, communica-
tion, and action, but they also drive the status quo; they hinder change 
because change is dependent upon changing not just thoughts and actions 
but assumptions. Unstated reasons drive the status quo because the 
speaker/writer assumes the reasons to be self-evident; if someone does 
not find the reasons to be self-evident, then that someone is an outsider 
to the powers-that-be-that-decide-assumptions. Unstated claims also 
drive the status quo. A mere lift of an eyebrow can tell someone else that 
an action should be taken, as when a parent walks into a teen's messy 
room, looks around, and lifts an eyebrow knowingly at the child. Even as 
the teen wails, "Whaaaattt???" s/he knows (based on previously estab-
lished premises) that she was supposed to have cleaned her room. 
However, the enthymeme possesses more power than its potential for 
conserving the status quo. It has the power to totally upend the status quo. 
If unstated enthymemic assumptions are "not settled or fixed," then 
thought, communication, and action are also "not settled or fixed"; 
instead, they are in a constant state of flux and negotiation. That is true 
for teens, for parents, for institutions, for countries. The Bush administra-
tion masterfully performs this flux even as it preaches a fixed neo-
conservative view of the world. Vice President Cheney merely had to 
mention on two or three occasions that Iraq was involved in 9/11; 
suddenly, thattotally specious claim became a common-sense reason that 
helped drive the US to war. President Bush did not have to state it; Vice 
President Cheney already had. All President Bush had to do was let that 
claim turned reason, turned "common-sense" assumption, haunt his 
discourse, unstated but rendering very real effects, one being the upend-
ing of world opinion about the US, from sympathy after 9/11 to less-than-
sympathy after the invasion of Iraq. The enthymeme is powerful. 
So why do I love the enthymeme if its traditional use is conservative 
and its postmodern use may be co-opted by neo-cons to help drive the US 
to war? I love it because it is a rhetorical tactic with the potential to help 
people construct their own arguments and analyze arguments directed to 
them-by detecting the unstated. Once such dark matter and energy are 
detected, we can determine if the detected assumptions, reasons, and 
. claims need to be celebrated or challenged. That is why the enthymeme 
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is a useful tactic for teaching critical thinking and writing: it helps unpack 
unstated assumptions, unstated reasons, and sometimes unstated claims. 
(Note: Ijust used another enthymeme, the unstated assumption being that 
unpacking unstated assumptions and reasons is necessary for critical 
thinking and writing. OK. I'll stop. But you get the idea). Getting student 
writers to think about unstated ideas and getting teachers to think about 
students' unstated ideas (as well as their own!) goes a long way toward 
helping students and teachers think and write more critically in the 
classroom and beyond. That is why I love the enthymeme. The messier 
the better. And because Jackson's postmodem take on the enthymeme 
helps readers navigate such "messes," his article is important. 
Are there other ways of reasoning rhetorically? Of course. But this is 
my point, and Jackson's: Do not sell the enthymeme short ... but do not 
whitewash its problematic functions either. 
The Unstated: Enthymemes of Whiteness 
Whiteness is a rhetorical trope that lends itself well to a pairing with the 
enthymeme because, currently, whiteness in the US is often unstated. 
Even so, this unstated whiteness signifies as an assumed norm, which 
haunts discourses on any topic, whether education, food, music, rhetori-
cal theory, and so forth.3 In "Local Whiteness, Localizing Whiteness," 
Ruth Frankenberg offers four reasons for studying how unstated white-
ness haunts cultural discourses: (l) to make whiteness visible; (2) to put 
all racial categories into play so as to make discussions of race symmetri-
cal; (3) to examine white selves; and (4) to excavate all racial/cultural 
locations so as to understand their functions and to be able to interrupt 
unproductive ones (1-2). Given that whiteness is frequently unstated and 
given that the enthymeme culls the unstated, I would like to explore how 
Jackson's concept of the enthymeme as antiracist strategy may actually 
effect all four of Frankenberg's charges. 
In the weird synergy that sometimes happens when I am writing, I 
read Jackson's article at the same time I received an e-mail from Kat 
Bodrie, a graduate student whom I have never met. As a result, Jackson's 
article provided a frame for my thinking about Bodrie' s e-mail, and her 
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e-mail provided a testing ground for my thinking about his article's 
engagement with enthymemic functions of whiteness. Theory and prac-
tice. Practice and theory. These two continually inform and challenge one 
another. As always, Adrienne Rich says it best: "If [theory] doesn't smell 
of the earth, it isn't good for the earth" ("Notes" 214). However, before 
I discuss how the article and the e-mail inform and challenge one another, 
let me share the e-mail (and express my gratitude to Kat Bodrie for 
permitting me to reprint it here): 
Dr. Ratcliffe, 
I'm a graduate student from the University of North Carolina at 
Wilmington, and Ijust read your book Rhetorical Listening. While 
reading, I realized that I had just listened to a comedy sketch by a 
(white) woman named Lisa Lampanelli. I don't know if you've 
heard of her before, but she talks about the common stereotypes of 
male and female blacks, male and female whites, Chicanas/os, and 
others. At first,! was aghast-how could shejust come out and say 
those things, andwasn 't the audience offended? But judging by the 
audience's reaction (and it sounded like a LOT of people), they 
were loving it. I've been thinking about it in conjunction with your 
book, and I noticed some of my own assumptions regarding 
whiteness and "race," and how, as I realized through my initial 
reaction to Lisa, I have had the common "white" presumption that 
talking about race should not be done. Now that I think about it, 
Lisa's comedy is just the opposite; by coming out and just saying 
these things, she is poking fun at stereotypes-recognizing them 
but not reinforcing them-and the audience can laugh along with 
her. Thank you for offering your perspective, and for offering a 
concrete method of pedagogy for such a (currently) difficult topic. 
Yours respectfully, 
Kat Bodrie 
Masters Student of English Literature 
University of North Carolina Wilmington (emphasis added) 
The three emphasized claims above are all enthymemes (and yes, this e-
mail contains many more than three). However, these three represent 
everyday enthymemes about the functions of whiteness in the US, circa 
2007. What I find fascinating about Bodrie's e-mail is that she does not 
simply channel existing enthymemes of whiteness to reinforce the status 
quo (that is, the current dominant cultural logic of color blindness, which 
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pretends not to see race in the US);4 instead, she employs the everyday 
enthymemes as antiracist strategies to navigate what Adrienne Ricli calls 
"the vast encircling presumption of whiteness" ("The distance" 181). 
(And yes, it did occur to me that someone else, say Ann Coulter, could 
argue that Bodrie does indeed perpetuate the "liberal" status quo in 
academe, which is proof ofthe multiplicity of enthymemic reasoning, but 
I digress). In addition to resisting the everyday enthymeme of color 
blindness, Bodrie demonstrates that the enthymeme is about more than 
just logic; it is also about visceral, bodily reactions that may serve as cues 
for reflection. That recognition is important, especially when dealing 
with issues of race, for race is about more than reason or logic. As Michael 
Eric Dyson states clearly: "[Race] ... is a set of beliefs and behaviors 
shaped by culture, rooted in history, and fueled by passions that transcend 
reason" (42). By attempting to state that which was formerly unstated, 
Bodrie practices in her e-mail whatJackson advocates in his article. In the 
process, she models a kind of thinking that may be employed in the 
classroom and beyond. 
First, let's address Bodrie's question about Lisa Lampanelli's com-
edy routine: "how could she just come out and say those things, and 
wasn't the audience offender!?" Turned from question to statement, this 
quotation translates into the following: those offensive things should not 
be talked about. How might this quotation function enthymemically in 
terms ofLampanelli's routine about race? One way is delineated below 
(note: in all three examples of Bodrie's enthymemes, the stated is 
underlined; the unstated, italicized): 
(1) Offensive topics should not be talked about. 
Racial, gender, and ethnic stereotypes are offensive topics. 
Racial, gender, and ethnic stereotypes should not be talked about. 
This enthymemic construction (and remember, it could be constructed 
differently) makes offensive topics the primary assumption, with race 
being one of many insulting topics that should not be talked about. It is 
common-sense knowledge that polite white US society does not willingly 
encourage insulting discourses, and even in informal settings white 
society is not known for playing the dozens (as evidenced by the locker 
room scene in Remember the Titans where a black athlete performs a "yo 
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mama" joke on a white athlete and the white athlete thinks he is being 
insulted instead ofbeing invited into the group). Bodrie' s above enthymeme 
makes sense within white society's unstated obliviousness to whiteness 
because, given the above assumption, it goes without saying that racist, 
gender, and ethnic jokes must offensive. Thus, this enthymeme may 
signify a conservative function of the enthymeme, which reinforces the 
status quo of white society without critiquing the status quo: in sum, race 
is not to be talked, or joked, about. However, Bodrie questions her 
performance of this enthymeme (the logos as she knows it), and as she 
does so, she begins making whiteness visible. 
Second, let's address Bodrie's description of her initial reaction to 
Lampanelli's comedy: "/ was aghast." How might her reaction function 
enthymemically in terms of Lampanelli's use of offensive topics? One 
way is outlined below: 
(2) The proper response when someone hears offensive topics is 
feeling aghast. 
I heard Lisa Lampanelli perform a comedy routine about offensive 
topics. 
I was aghast. 
Notice the leap from offensive topic to aghast. What is lost in that leap is 
attention to particular offensive topics. Because the category offensive 
topic includes so many different possibilities, the specific functions of 
anyone topic (for example, race) at particular times and particular places 
are lost; also lost are differences among the topics as well as differences 
among the contexts in which the topics are invoked. Remaining unstated, 
such specific functions and their differences cannot be defined, analyzed, 
challenged, or even (if appropriate) reinforced. The logic of this enthymeme 
leads directly to an emotional conclusion-being aghast. Within a color-
blind cultural logic, this emotional conclusion often functions not as a 
springboard for reflection but as closure, with a slight echo of moral 
righteousness haunting its presence: I am aghast. The end. However, by 
laying a book she was reading alongside her own reaction and listening 
to the discourses of both, Bodrie was able to hear the dissonance between 
the two discourses, which, in tum, made whiteness visible and rendered 
it capable of being stated, analyzed, and questioned. 
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Third, to see how Bodrie articulates moving beyond being aghast, 
let's address her claim about her former unstated presumption, which 
undergirded her previous two enthymemes: "/ have had the common 
'white' presumption that talking about race should not be done." How 
does this claim function enthymemically in terms ofBodrie' s understand-
ing of how race functions in the contemporary US? One way is listed 
below: 
(3) The idea that one should not talk about race is a "white" 
presumption. 
I thought that LL should not talk about race. 
I am functioning from a "white" presumption. 
With this claim, Bodrie has moved from thinking about race as one of 
many offensive topics, to thinking about it on its own terms with its own 
assumptions, one of which is that a "white" presumption exists. No longer 
is race simply an offensive, taboo subject; instead, it is an operative 
cultural category (grounded in bad science most certainly, but operative 
nevertheless). This move enables her to identify ideas and actions and 
people as "white." Just as importantly, she avoids a woe-is-me, aren't-all-
white-people-terrible, shouldn't-I-feel-guilty routine, which in the end is 
really all about the lamenting "I." Instead, she identifies the issue, and 
then she thinks more deeply about her reactions ("Now that / think about 
it"); reassesses her evaluation of cultural performances ("Lisa's comedy 
is just the opposite"); and revises her understanding of how race functions 
in the US ("she is poking fun at stereotypes-recognizing them but not 
reinforcing them"). And her concluding sentence, which refers to white-
ness as "such a (currently) difficult topic," implies that she possesses an 
historicized understanding of how race functions in the US at this 
particular moment as well as an understanding that over time it may 
change, both structurally and personally. 
In her e-mail, Bodrie narrates an enthymemic engagement with 
whiteness that takes her to a different place from whence she started. In 
his article, Jackson explains this phenomenon: the postmodern enthymeme 
ensures that people, in their search for the unstated, will end up in a 
different place, with the degree and quality of difference being particular 
to each enthymemic journey. And as Bodrie's enthymemic journey 
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demonstrates, going in search of the unstated can serve as a terrific 
antiracist strategy for pedagogy, in the classroom and beyond. 
Pedagogies of the Classroom, of Scholarship, of Life 
Jackson concludes his article with a nod toward pedagogy, claiming that 
rhetoric and composition scholar-teachers need to engage whiteness not 
just in one course but, by implication, in scholarship and life as well (629-
30). I agree. He claims that the issue to be taught is not intentional racism 
so much as the structural advantages proffered to people, things, and ideas 
coded white (606). I agree. He claims that just talking about whiteness is 
not in and of itself an ethical act (630). I agree. He claims it is not even 
a matter of moving from the stance of one-who-does-not-know to "'one 
who gets it'" (631). I agree-because "getting it" assumes a fantasy of 
mastery and closure and problem solved. If one lives in a racialized 
society that denies it is racialized, then what one "gets" is the challenge 
to engage race, and whiteness, in different ways every day. Jackson's 
article, Bodrie's e-mail, and my response here are simply moments from 
which we may move on to engage whiteness again and again, maybe the 
wiser for our past experiences, but not always. 
Despite the aforementioned common ground that I find with Jackson's 
article, there are three points on which I, respectfully, part company. First, 
I do not find the tropes of guilt (601) and blame to be particularly effective 
for pedagogy, in the classroom or beyond, because they make people 
(whites and non-whites) defensive and, thus, less open to contemplating 
contrary ideas. Instead, I find the tropes of responsibility and account-
ability more productive in getting students and others to see and engage 
systemic whiteness.s Jackson yokes guilt and responsibility on his first 
page. I try to unyoke them. Do I think guilt and blame exist? Of course. 
I simply do not find them effective springboards for pedagogical discus-
sions. Second, I do not find the trope of domination (604) particularly 
effective for pedagogy, in the classroom or beyond, except in discussions 
of the past; in discussions of the present, this trope tends to makes people 
defensive and, thus, less open to contemplating contrary ideas. Rather, I 
find the much-used distinction between the tropes of earned privilege and 
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unearned privilege (with whiteness being an unearned privilege) a much 
more productive way to enter pedagogical discussions of systemic 
oppression because all of us (non-whites and whites) have experienced 
both privileges at some point in our lives. And third, I do not think 
remaining silent always puts one in "de facto agreement with arguments 
for white supremacy as expressed in fragmented, mediated formal and 
informal discourse" (631). To his credit, Jackson does not accuse readers; 
he just repeats this claim in terms of himself. However, that claim invites 
readers to question whether their own silence puts them in "de facto 
agreement with arguments for white supremacy." Can it? You bet. Does 
it often? Yes. Does it always? I am not so sure ofthat. As Cheryl Glenn 
has argued in Unspoken, there are many reasons for silence, and they are 
not always negative. 
These differences of opinion, however, pale in comparison to my 
admiration for Jackson's project. My differences simply reflect my 
subject location, not necessarily the "wrongness" of his ideas. After all, 
pedagogues need to perform the pedagogies that work for them and for 
their students. Regardless of one's pedagogical method, however, the 
pedagogical challenge remains to make whiteness visible and to help 
students and others (whether coded white or not) articulate how we are 
all personally implicated (albeit differently) in systemic whiteness. That 
challenge is taken up in Bodrie's e-mail, when she narrates hearing 
whiteness in a comedy routine and explains how this hearing made 
whiteness visible to her. As a teaching moment, it is a performance of who 
she is and what she knows at a particular moment. The same is true for 
Matthew Jackson's article. Consequently, I am indebted to them both 
because, in this moment, they are teaching me to search for the unstated 




1. Although I would normally not use dictionary. com in a scholarly article 
and would more likely cite the OED, I do think it is useful to model how such 
sources that students are familiar with may be used for pedagogical purposes. 
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2. For more on Aristotle's ideas about enthymemes, see his Rhetoric (bk 2, 
pts. 22, 25). 
3. Some of these issues are discussed in my book, Rhetorical Listening. For 
a discussion of whiteness as a trope, see the introduction and chapter one. For a 
discussion of the history of whiteness in the US, see 12-16. And for a discussion 
of how whiteness haunts rhetorical theory, see chapter four. 
4. Jackson claims that white supremacy is the dominant cultural logic about 
race in the US (602); however, I think the dominant cultural logic has shifted 
more to color blindness. Both have their problems, of course: white supremacy 
exaggerates differences and color blindness exaggerates similarities. The differ-
ence lies, I think, in two assumptions: both assume racial categories exist in that 
white supremacy works to celebrate them while color blindness works to ignore 
them; and white supremacy assumes a racial great chain of being while color 
blindness assumes a naive equality that closes its eyes not just to "color" but to 
the inequities that a racialized society effects on people. 
5. For my arguments on responsibility and accountability, see chapters one 
and three in Rhetorical Listening. 
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So Much Depends Upon the Route 
Jennifer Beech 
When scholars engage in theoretical critique, they see 
themselves as intervening in an important issue or prob-
lem. In this regard, in the practice oftheory, the possibili-
ties of agency and action are primarily textual. In the 
practice of teaching, agency and action are experi-
enced in the moment-to-moment, day-to-day experi-
ence of teaching. 
-LisaEde 
